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  2 Miracles & Debacles: In Defense of Trade Openness  
Arvind Panagariya 
A key policy question confronting developing countries today is whether to opt for 
outward-oriented trade policies or yield to protectionism.  Last fifty years of experience 
overwhelmingly supports the case for choosing freer trade over protectionism. Virtually 
all growth miracles in the developing world have taken place in the presence of low or 
declining barriers and there are few growth debacles that can be attributed to sustained 
import surges.  Before I turn to the evidence, however, it is useful to sort out a series of 
confusions that have plagued the debate on this important subject. 
1  Non-sequiturs: Criticisms that Won’t Do 
Free-trade critics often advance arguments that seem superficially plausible but fail 
to stand up to closer scrutiny.  For example: 
•  Some critics cite countries that opened to trade and failed to achieve higher 
growth to make a case in favor of protectionism over liberal trade policies.   
Others argue that the existing econometric evidence fails to persuasively establish 
a causal link between barriers to trade and growth.  But such criticisms miss the 
point that the policy choice must be based not on whether openness by itself leads 
to higher growth but on whether it is more conducive to sustained growth than a 
protectionist regime.  Few serious advocates of free trade argue that openness is 
by itself sufficient for growth.  They fully recognize that in the absence of 
macroeconomic stability, policy credibility and enforcement of contracts, it is 
unlikely that a country will be able to register significantly high growth rates for a 
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open trading environment. 
•  Critics also attack the case for liberal trade polices on the ground that certain 
successful experiences of sustained growth were actually catalyzed by alternative 
policies such as government-engineered increase in investment demand or 
innovation.  But these critics fail to distinguish between initial catalysts to growth 
and policies necessary to sustain it.  Even if growth is initially stimulated by 
increased investment demand or innovation, growth is unlikely to be sustained if 
the trading environment is autarkic and continues to be autarkic.  Of course, if 
openness also serves as a direct stimulus to growth, it is an added advantage.  A 
careful study of the successful cases reveals that whatever the source of the initial 
stimulus, increased growth often leads to increased trade liberalization and vice 
versa.  The recent successful experiences of China and India graphically illustrate 
the process of growth and openness feeding on each other. 
•  Critics also like to cite examples of countries that managed to register high 
growth rates behind high walls of protection to conclude that protectionism 
works.  Again, high initial trade barriers do not preclude the onset of rapid 
growth, especially in countries such as Brazil, China and India that have large 
internal markets.  Indeed, growth process itself may sometimes be kicked off by 
gradual liberalization of an initially highly protected regime.  But such growth 
will sustain only if the country responds by undertaking liberalization that 
accommodates the necessary expansion of trade.  Evidence pointing to the fact 
that a country grew rapidly while still behind high protectionist wall does not 
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whether it was lowering or further raising the protectionist wall during the period 
of rapid growth. 
•  Critics also like to cite examples of countries that managed to register high 
growth while raising barriers to trade.  But pro-free trade economists have often 
recognized that in an initial phase of development and starting with relatively low 
barriers to trade, increased protection need not preclude fast growth as long as 
protection remains moderate and short-lived.  Late Bela Balassa, one of the early 
advocates of outward-oriented policies, explicitly recognized the positive role that 
the first stage of import substitution played in the development of South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore.  He defined this stage as the period during which imports 
of non-durable consumer goods such as textiles and apparel and the intermediate 
inputs used in them are replaced by domestic production.  In the present context, 
this qualification is largely academic since the time for such import substitution is 
now behind virtually all developing countries.  
•  Finally, the necessity of trade openness for growth is not inconsistent with the use 
of industrial policy.  Critics sometimes challenge the case for openness by 
pointing to what they regard as the success of interventionist industrial policies in 
high-growth economies of the Far East.  While the efficacy of industrial policies 
itself constitutes a separate subject of debate among economists, the success of an 
activist industrial policy does not prove the failure of outward-oriented policies.  
  The contrasting experiences of South Korea and India during the first three 
decades  (1950-1980) of their development vividly illustrate these points.  Therefore, I 
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issue.  The maintenance of a realistic exchange rate is an integral part of an outward-
oriented policy regime.  If the exchange rate is overvalued, discrimination against the 
traded goods sector emerges even with low formal trade barriers such as tariffs.   
Avoiding an overvalued exchange rate is not merely good for macroeconomic stability 
but is an essential condition for maintaining openness itself. 
2  A Tale of Two Countries: South Korea and India 
  Dani Rodrik (1995), an economist at Harvard university and a leading critic of 
outward-oriented policies, dismisses the importance of openness in Korea’s growth 
experience during 1960s and 1970s on the ground that the country grew rapidly because 
its government "managed to engineer a significant increase in the private return to capital" 
by "subsidizing and coordinating investment decisions."  He views the expansion of trade as 
merely a passive outcome of the process unleashed by this expansion of investment: new 
investments required machinery imports and the increased need for imports mandated 
increased exports. 
  To be sure, one can question the basic premise underlying this simplistic story of 
Rodrik. During 1961-80, Korea’s exports of goods and services grew at an annual rate of 
23.7 percent in real terms.  Even though Korea began at a relatively low exports-to-GDP 
ratio of 5.3 percent in 1961, by 1980, the exports-to-GDP ratio had reached 33.1 percent!  
This dramatic growth in exports, which came in large part after 1965, had to be the outcome 
of active policy changes rather than a passive response to the growth in government 
coordinated investment boom.  More importantly, the dramatic growth in exports had to be a 
significant stimulus to the economy at the margin.  The efficiency gains that accrue from 
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the-art technology via imports of new products and machinery had to be of primary 
importance. 
  Indeed, economists Larry Westphal and Kwang Suk Kim (1982), who have 
diligently studied the Korean experience during the first three decades of its development 
and strongly believe in the efficacy of industrial policy, assign the central role to activist 
trade policy in stimulating growth in Korea.  Thus, consider the following statement from 
the concluding section of their long and careful study (p. 271): 
  “The growth of manufactured exports over the fifteen years from 1960 to 
1975 contributed to Korea’s industrial development in various ways.  Export 
expansion was directly responsible for more than one quarter of the growth of 
manufactured output and for an even larger fraction of the increase in manufactured 
employment.  In turn, the manufacturing sector has accounted for almost 40 percent 
of the growth in both GNP and employment.  These figures understate the 
contribution of export growth.  They do not reflect the backward linkages to 
domestically produced intermediate inputs, the multiplier effect resulting from 
increased consumption and investment resulting from additional income earned, or 
the increase in economic efficiency that results from exporting in accordance with a 
country’s comparative advantage.” 
  Thus, Westphal and Kim turn the Rodrik story almost on its head attributing 
partially the growth in investment itself to export growth and the income increase 
accompanying it.  In a subsequent article, Westphal (1990) notes, “Korea’s industrial 
performance owes a great deal to the government’s promotional policies toward exports and 
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exports have created an atmosphere--rare in the Third World--in which businessmen could 
be certain that the economic system would respond to and subsequently reward their efforts 
aimed at expanding and upgrading exports.”  Exports were not a passive response to the 
import demand generated by investment boom but one of the “propellers” of the investment 
activity itself. 
  But suppose we grant Rodrik the point that it was the successful coordination of the 
investment decisions by the government that triggered Korea’s growth.  Does this fact 
diminish the importance of outward-oriented trade policies that Korea pursued?  In other 
words, what would have happened if Korea had chosen to continue raising trade barriers and 
moved beyond the first stage of import substitution by attempting to produce its own 
durable goods, raw materials used in them and machinery?  After all, if import substitution 
works at all stages of development, as Rodrik seems to believe, domestic machinery 
production was an option that could have been exercised. 
  This is not idle speculation.  During the period under consideration, India also tried 
to solve the investment-coordination problem through explicit investment planning.  By the 
standards applied by Rodrik to Korea, public interventions in India were surely successful 
with total investment as a proportion of GDP rising from 15.7 percent in 1960-61 (India’s 
financial year begins April 1 and end March 31 the following year) to 22.7 percent in 1980-
81.  Public investment consistently accounted for more than a third of this investment.     
Through macroeconomic stability, policy credibility and legal institutions capable of 
enforcing contracts, India was successful in pushing its GDP growth rate from less than 1 
percent during the first half of the 20
th century to the 3-4 percent range during 1950-80.  But 
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and seventies principally because it opted for an increasingly protectionist trade policy 
regime with nearly all imports coming under strict licensing by early 1970s.  By the mid-
1970s, India’s trade regime had become so repressive that imports (other than oil and 
cereals) had fallen from the already low level of 7 percent of GDP in 1957-58 to 3 
percent in 1975-76.  Whereas Korea recognized the importance of competing against the 
world’s most efficient producers and the need for importing the state-of-the-art machinery 
from abroad, India chose to hide behind a steel wall of protection, manufacturing its own 
machinery (and steel!).  The result was an annual per-capita GDP growth of 6.3 percent in 
Korea and 1.1 percent in India during 1961-80.  Thus, Rodrik’s conclusion that outward 
orientation of the Korean economy was merely “the result of the increase in the demand for 
imported capital goods" misses the important point that ultimately such openness was the 
result of a conscious policy choice made by the country.   
  Differences between the experiences of Korea and India during the first three 
decades of development are to be seen not just in terms of the outcome variables such as 
growth in trade and GDP but also policies and policy changes.  Whereas Korea consciously 
moved away from import-substitution to outward-oriented trade regime relatively early in 
the game, India became progressively protectionist. 
  Until 1960, Korea pursued the policy of import substitution of non-durable 
consumer goods and their intermediate inputs.  During this phase, the real exchange rate was 
overvalued, foreign-exchange controls were widely practiced, finished consumer goods 
were subject to high tariffs and the government relied progressively on quantitative import 
controls.  In early 1960s, Korea had to choose between extending the import substitution to 
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the latter.  Korean won was devalued first in 1961 to 130 won per dollar and then in 1964 to 
256 won per dollar.  During 1961-65, measures such as preferential export credit for 
exporters, tariff and indirect domestic tax exemptions on inputs used in exports, direct tax 
reductions on income earned on exports, and accelerated depreciation allowances for the 
fixed assets of major export industries were introduced.  In 1962, even an export targeting 
system was set up.   
  During 1966-78, Korea institutionalized the export-oriented strategy, 
complementing it with some import liberalization.  The government gradually relaxed the 
quantitative restrictions on imports and reduced tariffs through several reforms.  Moreover, 
it roughly maintained the real exchange rate at the 1965 level through periodic adjustments 
of the nominal exchange rate and/or adjustment in export subsidies. 
  The history of trade policy in India, documented systematically in Bhagwati and 
Desai (1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975), bears a sharp contrast to that of Korea.  
Years 1950-56 saw some phased liberalization but a foreign exchange crisis in early 1957 
put an end to it.  Quantitative restrictions on imports, industrial licensing and foreign 
exchange controls were progressively tightened and expanded.  This process continued till 
1966 though some export subsidization schemes were introduced in 1962 and expanded 
subsequently to partially offset the discrimination against exports.  Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1975) describe the regime during 1957-66 thus: “The import and exchange policy regime, 
throughout this period, aimed at comprehensive, direct control over foreign exchange 
utilization.  Thus administrative decisions had to be made over the allocation of foreign 
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mechanism was thus almost complete during this period.” 
  During 1966-68, India went through a brief liberalization episode.  In June 1966, the 
rupee was devalued by 57.5 percent from 4.7 rupees to 7.5 rupees per dollar.  The 
devaluation was accompanied by some liberalization of import licensing, cuts in import 
tariffs and export subsidies.  Because the devaluation turned into a serious political 
liability (in part due to the widespread impression that the World Bank had forced it), the 
process of liberalization was quickly reversed.  According to Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1975, p. 30), by 1969-70, the liberalization had been largely reversed with the import 
premium back to 30 to 50 percent.  Almost all liberalizing initiatives were reversed and 
import controls tightened.  This regime was consolidated and strengthened in the 
subsequent years and remained more or less intact until the beginning of a period of 
phased liberalization in the late 1970s.   
3  Miracles and Debacles 
The experience of Korea is not unique.  We now have considerable systematic 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that openness is a necessary condition for fast growth.  
Specifically, the Global Development Network Growth Database provides growth rates 
for approximately 200 countries over a period of 38 years from 1961 to 1999.  Despite 
missing entries in a number of cases, the database is sufficiently comprehensive to allow 
a systematic analysis of the issue at hand. 
Since the precise division of data over time turns out not to matter, I divide them into 
two equal periods: 1961-1980 and 1980-1999.  For each 19-year period, I identify 
countries that grew at 3 percent or more in per-capita terms as “miracles” and those that 
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income correlates with growth in exports and imports for miracles and debacles.  Since 
trade is an endogenous variable and is likely to respond positively to GDP growth, this is 
only the first step toward establishing the necessity of outward oriented policies for 
sustained rapid growth.  I later return to the issue of the link between trade policies and 
growth.    
Table 1 shows all non-oil-exporting developing countries that grew at 3 percent or 
more in per-capita terms during 1961-80 in the declining order of the growth rates.   
Alongside, third and fourth column show annual growth rates of exports and imports.  
The last column shows the population of the country at the beginning of the period under 
consideration.  The most remarkable point to note in Table 1 is that even though 1960s 
and 1970s are commonly identified with the import-substitution phase in developing 
countries, virtually all countries that grew rapidly did so while rapidly expanding their 
exports and imports.  The countries in this group come from virtually all continents in the 
South including, especially, Latin America, which is often described as having led the 
developing world in the pursuit of import substitution.  Brazil, which grew at the impressive 
rate of 4.6 percent, expanded its exports and imports at 8.1 and 7.6 percent, respectively, 
during the period.  Among countries that grew at 3.6 percent or more in per-capita terms, the 
lowest recorded growth rate of imports was 7.2 percent for Tunisia, which grew at 4 percent 
in per-capita terms.  Even as we go down the growth-rate column, there are only two 
countries that register relatively low growth rates of imports: Mauritius and Kenya with 
import growth of 3.8 and 3.6 percent, respectively. 
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critics of free trade go so far as to contend that it is responsible for declining incomes.  To 
examine this contention, Table 2 lists all countries that experienced growth debacle during 
1961-80.  For the purpose of the table, growth debacle is defined as a reduction in the per-
capita income on a sustained basis.  It is evident that the weight of evidence is hugely 
against trade openness being responsible for the debacles.  Out of the seven debacle cases in 
which we have data on both growth rates of per-capita income and trade, only two show 
significant growth in imports.  In the other cases, declines in per-capita incomes are 
accompanied by import growth of less than 2 percent. 
This experience is repeated during the second period under study, 1980-99.  Tables 3 
and 4 show growth rates of per-capita incomes and trade for the miracle and debacle 
countries, respectively.  As in Table 1, leaving aside a handful of the cases, the miracle 
countries in Table 3 experience very substantial growth in imports and exports.  Two 
largest countries in the world, China and India, join the club of miracle-growth countries 
in this period and they both show respectable rates of growth of both exports and imports.  
In turn, Table 4 provides more substantial evidence that debacles are rarely accompanied 
by import surges.  We now have as many as 65 countries in this category and in no case 
does the rate of growth of imports reach even 6 percent.  And in many cases, it is actually 
negative and large in absolute terms. 
If we go by the number of countries that grew at 3 percent or more in per-capita-
income terms, performance during 1961-80 is clearly superior to that during 1980-99.  As 
many as 33 non-oil exporting developing countries grew at this high rate during the first 
period compared with 26 in the second.  Yet, if we go by the population in the 
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stands out.  Whereas the population of the countries growing at 3 percent or more at the 
beginning of the period was only 356.5 million during the first period, it was a high of 2.1 
billion during the second period.  Those who have chosen to characterize the 1980s and 
1990s the lost decades of development have often overlooked this crucial fact. 
The explanation for why the period 1980-99 has been viewed unfavorably relative to 
the prior two decades, especially 1960s, is that this period produced a very large number 
of debacles that also impacted a very substantial population of the world.  Thus, during 
1961-80, debacles were limited to 14 developing countries with a total population of 68.6 
million at the beginning of the period.  But during 1981-99, there were as many as 65 
debacle countries accounting for 621.4 million people at the beginning of the period.  Not 
only did a large number of tiny countries in Africa do poorly during this latter period, the 
large majority of the former Soviet republics, some with sizable populations, also joined 
the ranks of the debacle countries.  It is the coincidence of this fact with a series of 
financial-flow crises in Latin America and East Asia that fueled the anti-globalization 
movement, victimizing liberal trade policies in the process despite the fact that trade had 
little to do with either of the phenomena. 
4  Trade Volumes versus Trade Barriers 
Before I turn to some additional, country-specific evidence, let me address an 
important criticism of the link between growth and openness offered by free-trade 
skeptics (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999).  Observing that the cross-country-regression 
studies linking growth and direct measures of trade policy such as tariff and non-tariff 
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and openness. 
For one thing, the evidence from cross-country regression studies is not as weak as 
critics would have us believe.  Following the Rodriguez-Rodrik critique, Romain 
Wacziarg and Karen Welch (2002) have offered more compelling evidence linking 
openness and growth.  Interestingly, in the first part of their paper, they themselves begin 
by rejecting the Sachs-Warner approach that Rodriguez and Rodrik criticize.  They then 
construct a panel data set that allows them to exploit within and between country 
variations.  They base their openness indicators on the date at which individual countries 
liberalized their import policies.  In a panel of countries extending from 1950 to 1998, 
they find that on average, a country grows at 1.5 percent per annum higher rate in the 
liberalized phase than in the protected phase, controlling for country and year effects.  
Because trade reforms sometimes occur during periods of macroeconomic instability, the 
authors also experiment with excluding the three years surrounding the reform but find 
the results robust to this modification. 
But just for the sake of argument, suppose we grant critics the point that evidence 
to-date does not conclusively establish a positive link between low or declining trade 
barriers and growth.  But this is hardly sufficient to reject the case for outward-oriented 
policies.  Once we agree that fast growth in per-capita GDP strongly correlates with fast 
growth in trade, the rejection of a link between low or declining trade barriers and growth 
in per-capita incomes is equivalent to the rejection of a link between low or declining 
trade barriers and growth in trade.  Admittedly, trade barriers are not the only 
determinant of growth in trade.  But they are hardly irrelevant to it.  In the extreme case, 
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policies.  The experience of India until the late 1970s, discussed earlier, is a case in point.  
It will be a stretch to argue that India’s trade failed to grow rapidly because India’s GDP 
failed to grow rapidly.  India consciously chose to suppress the growth in trade through 
draconian trade-policy restrictions.  Additionally, if free-trade skeptics truly believe that 
growth in trade is unrelated to the level of trade barriers, they should be indifferent to 
them.  But their concern with such barriers, which sometimes goes so far as to blame 
their removal for economic debacles, betrays their faith in a positive correlation between 
trade barriers and growth in trade. 
In large part, the controversy surrounding the evidence in support of the positive 
link between low or declining trade barriers and growth in per-capita income is the result 
of our inability to accurately measure the protective effect of a given set of trade barriers.  
Difficulties in measuring the effects of non-tariff barriers are well known.  For example, 
the effect of import licensing depends crucially on the severity with which it is enforced.  
Traditionally, developing countries have not explicitly specified the quantities permitted 
under licensing.  Instead, they stipulate conditions under which an import license can be 
obtained.  A license may be issued depending on the desired use of the product, its 
proposed user, availability of like domestic products and the availability of foreign 
exchange.  Under such a regime, even without any formal change in the policy regime, 
imports can be permitted in smaller or larger quantities through a more or less strict 
administration of the existing rules. 
Even when restrictions take the form of tariffs, aggregating them into a single 
measure that is comparable across countries is difficult.  A 15 percent uniform tariff has a 
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10 percent duty and another half to 20 percent duty.  Yet, when aggregated for purposes 
of regressions, they are both set equal to 15 percent.  More dramatically, often a two-part 
tariff consisting of 20 and 10 percent tariff rates can have a more protective effect than a 
single 20 percent tariff rate.  Thus, starting with 20 percent tariff on auto parts as well as 
automobiles, a reduction in the tariff on the former increases the effective protection to 
the latter.  If domestic output of auto parts is small, this will likely result in increased 
overall protection in the economy.  Not surprisingly, in his provocative paper “Measuring 
outward orientation in LDCs:  Can it be done?” Pritchett (1996) finds that some of the 
measures of openness used in cross-country growth regressions are actually negatively 
correlated.  This means that if one measure yielded a positive correlation between growth 
and trade barriers, the other one would do exactly the opposite. 
Also important in assessing the impact of openness on growth is the real exchange 
rate.  Even when countries liberalize trade but leave the real exchange rate overvalued, 
discrimination against traded goods remains.  In this respect, the Rodriguez-Rodrik criticism 
of Sachs and Warner that once the black-market premium is taken out of their index, the link 
between openness and growth disappears is itself problematic.  Black-market premium itself 
can be a measure of the overvaluation of the exchange rate and the resulting discrimination 
against traded goods and therefore arguably belongs in the openness index. 
5  Import Substitution: Is Latin America an Exception? 
  Going by the number of countries experiencing rapid growth, Rodrik (1999) 
characterizes the years 1960-73 as the golden period of growth for developing countries.  
Per-capita incomes in as many as 30 countries grew annually at rates equaling or exceeding 
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countries during 1973-84 to 1984-94.  Noting that 1960-73 was the period of import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) and 1984-94 that of liberalization, Rodrik concludes that 
this suggests the triumph of ISI. 
  Much is wrong with this story.  To begin with the proposition that 1960-73 defined 
the golden period of growth for developing countries is itself questionable.  For it is based 
on counting the number of countries that grew rapidly.  But most of these countries were 
tiny in terms of population as well as GDP.  As already emphasized above, if we choose to 
count the number of people in the developing countries impacted by high growth, we get a 
different picture.  With East and South Asia growing rapidly during 1980s and 1990s, one 
can as easily argue that it is these decades that define the golden period of growth.  Indeed, if 
we consider developing countries as a whole, the growth rate is higher in the 1980s and 
1990s than during 1960-73. 
  But let us set aside this qualification and consider Rodrik’s case.  How is ISI to be 
defined?  Rodrik offers no definition.  Nor does he make the case that the fast growing 
countries during 1960-73 were import substituting and doing so more vigorously than the 
slow-growing countries during the same period.  Indeed, he does not even look at growth 
rates of exports and imports or trade policies.  The reader must simply take him on faith that 
the period in question was one of ISI. 
  But detailed country studies conducted over the last three decades provide 
substantial evidence that sheds light on this issue.  Two large-scale projects, one directed 
by Little Scitovsky and Scott (1970) at the OECD and the other by Bhagwati and Krueger 
(1974) at the NBER, offer detailed documentation of the success achieved by countries that 
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and early 1970s.  In addition, we have the important study edited by Balassa (1982). 
  According to Westphal and Kim (1982), Korea’s per-capita GNP at 1970 prices 
grew at rates 0.7, 3.6, 8.8 and 7.5 percent per annum during 1955-60, 1960-65, 1965-70 
and 1970-75, respectively.  Thus, the performance during the core import-substitution 
period, 1955-60, was not as spectacular as one might think.  By 1961, Korea had already 
begun to move toward outward-oriented policies.  A similar story holds for Singapore, 
which went through a truly brief import-substitution phase during 1965-67 and with 
relatively low protection (see Augustine Tan and Ow Chin Hock 1982) and Taiwan, 
which perhaps had the best performance under import substitution during 1952-60 but 
even then not nearly as good as under outward orientation (T. H. Lee and Kuo-Shu Liang 
1982). 
 Perhaps  prima facie one would expect the greatest scope for making a case in 
favor of import substitution in Latin America.  After all, this is where much of the initial 
intellectual stimulus for the desirability of import-substitution policies had originated.  
But even here closer examination reveals a different picture than painted by Rodrik.  
Thus, the case of Brazil, by far the largest country on the continent and the star performer 
of 1960-73, fails to fit the ISI model.  Its exports and imports in constant 1995 dollars 
grew at the impressive annual rates of 7.8 and 8.9 percent, respectively during this period.  
With imports rapidly substituting for domestic production and exports accounting for 
increasingly larger share of the GDP, prima-facie Brazil cannot be characterized as 
succeeding through import substitution. 
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Brazilian growth experience during the post 1960 era fails to fit the ISI story.  Thus, 
consider Brazil’s growth rates during 1961-68, 1968-1975 and 1975-80.  During 1961-68, 
the average growth rate was 1.6 percent followed by 8.3 and 3.5 percent, respectively, in 
the subsequent periods.  It turns out that thoughtful trade policy specialists on Brazil 
describe the period 1965-73 as one of “cautious outward-looking trade policy 
liberalization” and 1974-80 as one of “renewed inward-looking policies.”  During the 
former period, Brazil adopted a number of policy measures aimed at integrating itself into 
the global economy.  On the exchange-rate front, it undertook several devaluations to 
correct the overvaluation of the real exchange rate and later adopted the crawling peg to 
ensure its stability.  It also introduced several export incentives to reduce the anti-export 
bias.  Finally, it lowered the average legal tariff (including surcharges) for manufacturing 
from 99 to 57 percent and for agriculture from 53 to 34 percent. 
  This still leaves the question why Latin America failed to grow during 1980s 
despite substantial trade liberalization.  Here we must recall the qualification that trade 
openness is an important necessary ingredient in the fast-growth recipe but not the only 
ingredient.  Therefore, the debacle of 1980s in Latin America is to be attributed not to 
sustained import surges trade that did not happen but to macroeconomic instability that 
resulted from short-term capital mobility, which most Latin American countries had 
embraced by then.  The seventies had been characterized by rising foreign debt in many 
Latin American countries with debt-service as a proportion of exports rising to 30 percent 
or more by early 1980s in many cases. On top of that came the Volcker-era interest-rate 
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and choked all growth potential. 
  But even the 1980s onward Latin America offers an example that supports the 
hypothesis that trade openness is necessary for growth.  During the past two decades, 
Chile is perhaps the only major country in Latin American that has registered sustained 
rapid growth.  Its GDP grew at the annual rates of 5.3 and 5.9 percent respectively during 
1981-91 and 1991-01.  During the same time periods, its exports of goods and services 
grew annually at 8.6 and 9 percent, respectively with the imports to GDP ratio rising 
from 26.8 percent in 1981 to 32.7 percent in 2001.   
Like many other Latin American countries, Chile opened up its economy to trade 
by slashing tariffs and undertook the reforms such as privatization.  What distinguished it 
from the former, however, was the management of macroeconomic affairs.  For example, 
on the average, Chile had a balanced budget during 1980s and a fiscal surplus during 
1990s.  Moreover, this fiscal discipline was accompanied by a reduction in both 
government spending and taxes.  The central government spending dropped to 20 percent 
of GDP in 1990 from 32 percent in 1985 though it has since crept up to 24 percent.  
Through prudent management of monetary policy, Chile also brought inflation down to 3 
percent in 1999 from 21 percent in 1989.   Above all, Chile has avoided financial-capital-
flow crises through a credible policy regime in general and judicious use of capital 
controls in particular.   
6  Additional Country Evidence: India and China 
  The experience of China and India during 1980s and 1990s lends further support to 
the hypothesis that outward-oriented policies constitute a necessary ingredient into high-
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both trade and foreign investment side by side with other policy measures.  The results were 
spectacular.  China’s GDP grew at near double-digit rates during both 1980s and 1990s with 
per-capita incomes more than quadrupling over the two decades.  This was accompanied by 
the annual growth in imports of goods and services at 10.3 percent during 1980s and 16.3 
percent during 1990s.  The corresponding growth rates of exports of goods and services 
were 12.9 and 15.2 percent. 
  India’s experience is slightly more complicated.  As I document in Panagariya 
(2004), the country undertook several liberalizing steps during 1980s, especially in the latter 
half of the decade, which allowed a more liberal flow of foreign raw materials and 
machinery.  Expanded borrowing abroad added further to the expansion of imports and 
investment.  The country also expanded domestic demand through fiscal stimulus supported 
by large deficits.  This strategy allowed the country to achieve a growth rate of nearly 5.5 
percent during 1980s, though it also increased foreign and domestic debt at an unsustainable 
rate.  The result was a macroeconomic crisis in 1991 that stimulated more genuine reforms 
including more systematic liberalization of trade.  In approximately a decade, import 
licensing, which had covered approximately 80 percent of the tariff lines, was entirely 
abolished and the highest tariff rate was brought down from 355 percent to 30 percent.  The 
result was a growth rate of nearly 6 percent during 1990s with a rapidly declining ratio of 
foreign debt to GDP.  Reforms being more systematic during 1990s, there appear to be no 
signs of a macroeconomic crisis this time around. 
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As a final point, let me note that despite their apparent difference of opinion, the 
bottom line drawn by free-trade skeptics is so close to the position taken by many pro-
free-trade economists as to be virtually indistinguishable from it.  Thus, in public 
perception, foremost among skeptical economists today is the Nobel Laureate Joseph 
Stiglitz.  Yet a careful pro-free-trade economist finds very little in his widely publicized 
book Globalization and its Discontents (Stiglitz 2002) with which to disagree.  When it 
comes down to putting down their ideas on the paper, skeptics end up singing the free-
trade economist’s song! 
In his book, Stiglitz never questions the importance of liberal trade policies for 
development.  On the contrary, he explicitly recognizes their role in all successful cases 
of sustained growth.  His beef with free trade hovers around two propositions: trade 
liberalization must be gradual and rich countries need to do their part by removing trade 
barriers on products of interest to developing countries, especially agriculture where 
domestic and export subsidies further undermine the interests of developing countries. 
Pro-free-trade economists have written extensively and affirmatively on both 
issues.  Indeed, since the Kennedy Round of negotiations, gradualism has been an 
integral part of all liberalization under the GATT/WTO auspices.  As regards 
liberalization in agriculture and industrial products of interest to developing countries, the 
problem has been recognized for decades.  The lack of progress, however, has much to do 
with the absence of developing countries from the negotiating table until the Uruguay 
Round.  This absence has meant that developed countries negotiated principally on 
products that they traded with one another.  In fact, when developing countries did at last 
  21 join the negotiations in the Uruguay Round, agreement to end the import quotas in 
developed countries on textiles and apparel was actually reached and agriculture 
appeared on the liberalization agenda. 
But let us return to what Stiglitz has to say about the role of liberal trade policies 
themselves in the process of development.  On the second page of first chapter of his 
book appears the following statement (Stiglitz 2002, p. 4): 
“Opening up to international trade has helped many countries grow far more 
quickly than they would otherwise have done.  International trade helps economic 
development when a country’s exports drive its economic growth.  Export-led 
growth was the centerpiece of the industrial policy that enriched much of Asia 
and left millions of people there far better off.”   
  This assertion is not only consistent with what the present author has said earlier 
in this paper but actually stronger.  Stiglitz sees a causal link between growth and low or 
declining trade barriers and, contrary to Rodrik (1995), assigns the central role to the 
latter for the success of Asia.  Later in the chapter (p. 6), he turns to one of his two central 
criticisms of free trade: 
  “The critics of globalization accuse Western countries of hypocrisy, and 
the critics are right.  The Western countries have pushed poor countries to 
eliminate trade barriers, but kept up their own barriers, preventing developing 
countries from exporting their agricultural products and so depriving them of 
desperately needed export income.” 
In so far as Stiglitz implies here that developing countries have now liberalized 
their markets and developed countries have not or that developing countries have 
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(2002), we have documented this fallacy systematically.  But in so far as Stiglitz makes a 
case for more, not less, liberalization by developed countries and argues that such 
liberalization is beneficial to developing countries, few trade economists would have a 
reason to disagree with him.  Where free trade economists will part company with him is 
if he implies here that developing countries should have chosen to keep higher trade 
barriers because of continuing agricultural protectionism in the rich countries.  For, as 
Stiglitz himself concedes in the previous quotation, the countries in East Asia could 
successfully penetrate rich country markets despite agricultural protection because they 
themselves chose to be more outward oriented. 
Subsequently, in Chapter 3, Stiglitz complains about the unemployment caused by 
trade liberalization and cites East Asian economies as having been successful because 
they liberalized “slowly and in a sequenced way.”  Again, most trade economists 
recognize that trade liberalization, like any other effective policy change, leads to 
reallocation of resources and in the process may cause dislocation in the short run.  There 
are generally two solutions to this problem: creation of adjustment programs and 
gradualism in policy change.  Often developing countries lack resources for adjustment 
programs so that gradualism is the main option.  Recent experiences of China and India 
suggest that gradualism can indeed allow countries to accomplish substantial 
liberalization relatively painlessly. 
  Stiglitz reiterates the gradualism theme in Chapter 7, entitled “Better Roads to the 
Market,” of his book.  The title of this chapter is itself revealing: in so far as the ultimate 
destination is concerned, Stiglitz is in agreement with the mainstream economists that 
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China and Poland, he once again makes a pitch for gradualism.  Here, in so far as Poland 
is concerned, he is wrong to assert that the country moved gradually in the area of trade.  
Soon after it broke away from the Soviet Union, Poland quickly adopted a very liberal 
trade policy regime and proceeded in quick succession to sign a free trade area agreement 
with the European Union.  Most developing countries have been in the business of trade 
liberalization much longer and have substantially more protected trade regimes than 
Poland today.  Thus, if Poland passes the test of gradualism in trade policy, most other 
developing countries pass it as well. 
The Stiglitz view on trade policy that emerges from a careful reading of his book 
is essentially applicable to other prominent free-trade skeptics.  Generally speaking, 
serious economists critical of globalization rarely take a firm stand against free trade.  
Much of the discomfort of these economists with globalization derives from the injury 
inflicted by financial crises that followed the embrace of short-term capital mobility by 
Latin America and East Asia.  Free trade has simply turned into an innocent victim of 
that discomfort. 
Thus, consider a recent paper by the Harvard University economist Richard 
Freeman (2002) on why and how to raise labor standards around the world.   In the early 
part of this paper, Freeman expresses deep admiration of anti-globalization demonstrators 
and mercilessly attacks various forms of globalization including trade liberalization.  To 
quote him, “While orthodox policies have a certain logic inside simple Macro and Trade 
models, whether they are right for real economies is less clear.  Cross-country evidence 
  24 shows that policy measures relating to openness such as tariffs and trade barriers have 
little link to growth.”   
Yet, in the later part of the paper when Freeman draws up his own list of steps 
that may be taken to promote labor standards in the poor countries, liberal trade policies 
occupy a place of pride on it.  “Elimination of tariffs and other barriers to LDCs, 
particularly in agriculture, and reduction of huge debt burdens almost certainly can create 
more good for more people than improved labor standards for workers in the export 
sector or even more broadly,” he writes. 
One might still argue that skeptics do not advocate liberalization by the poor 
countries themselves.  Instead, their recommendations are limited to the removal of trade 
barriers imposed against their products by rich countries.  But such a position would be 
logically inconsistent.  If skeptics believe that the removal of rich country barriers 
stimulates poor country exports by making the latter more profitable, they cannot 
simultaneously argue that poor country liberalization, which also makes their exports 
more profitable by lowering the relative price of import-competing goods, does not 
accomplish the same objective.   
Indeed, if the poor country barriers are high, they are likely to fail to take 
advantage of even the rich country liberalization.  For example, during 1960s and 1970s, 
while the more open Far Eastern economies took advantage of the progressive opening 
and expansion of the rich country markets and managed to register spectacular export 
growth, autarkic India failed to register rapid growth of exports as well as GDP.   
Symmetrically, the poor country liberalization will fail to bear fruit if their rich country 
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the rich country door to let them in. 
Rodrik seems to recognize at least some of the logic behind a country’s own 
liberalization more explicitly when confronted with the choice between liberal and 
protectionist trade policies.  Thus, in his famous critique of econometric studies linking 
growth and trade, written jointly with Francisco Rodriguez, he states in the last to first 
paragraph, “We do not want to leave the reader with the impression that we think trade 
protection is good for economic growth. We know of no credible evidence--at least for 
the post-1945 period--that suggests that trade restrictions are systematically associated 
with higher growth rates.”   
The paper goes on to conclude, “The effects of trade liberalization may be on 
balance beneficial on standard comparative-advantage grounds; the evidence provides no 
strong reason to dispute this. What we dispute is the view, increasingly common, that 
integration into the world economy is such a potent force for economic growth that it can 
effectively substitute for a development strategy.”  But few thoughtful trade economists 
consider free trade as sufficient for fast growth.  On the contrary, many of them also 
happen to be serious development economists.  As an example, the early advocacy of 
freer trade policy in India by Bhagwati and Desai (1970) carried many more chapters on 
domestic policy and institutional reforms than on the advocacy of liberal trade policies.  
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capita  Exports Imports 
Population in 
Million (1961) 
Botswana 8.5      0.5 
Malta 7.3      0.3 
Singapore 7.2      1.5 
Hong Kong, China  6.9  10.8  10.6  3.2 
Gabon 6.6  10.6  12.1  0.5 
Taiwan, China  6.4      11.0 
Korea, Rep.  6.3  23.7  18.0  25.7 
Lesotho 4.8  7.6  11.8  0.9 
Trinidad and  4.7  3.8  9.1  0.9 
Thailand 4.6  9.3  9.6  27.2 
Brazil 4.6  8.1  7.6  75.0 
Malaysia 4.4  6.9  7.2  8.4 
Barbados 4.4      0.2 
Israel 4.2  10.8  8.1  2.2 
Georgia 4.1    4.2 
Cote d'Ivoire  4.1  7.6  7.9  3.9 
Seychelles 4.0     0.0 
Tunisia 4.0  8.3  7.2  4.3 
Bermuda 4.0      0.0 
Ecuador 3.7  8.2  8.0  4.6 
Dominican 3.6  5.6  10.6  3.3 
Ireland 3.6  8.0  7.8  2.8 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  3.5  5.4  8.1  26.5 
Indonesia 3.5  6.5  10.2  95.9 
  30 Paraguay 3.5  3.0  10.6  1.9 
Mauritius 3.5  2.4  3.8 0.7 
Mexico 3.4  8.6  7.8  38.1 
Panama 3.4    1.2 
Belize 3.4      0.1 
Togo 3.2  9.9  8.8  1.5 
Fiji 3.0  7.6  7.7  0.4 
Mauritania 3.0  11.3  7.7  1.0 
Kenya 3.0  3.3  3.6  8.6 
 
*Non-oil-exporting developing countries with per-capita GDP growth rate of 3 percent or 
more (33 countries with a combined population of 356.5 million people in 1961). 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Bank GDN database.  




capita  Exports   Imports  
Population in 
Million (1961) 
Central African  -0.1      1.6 
Zambia -0.3  1.0  0.4  3.2 
Somalia -0.4      2.9 
Madagascar -0.4  1.2  1.8 5.5 
Dominica -0.4     0.1 
Ghana -0.4  -2.7  -3.0  7.1 
Guinea-Bissau -0.5      0.5 
Niger -0.5  3.5  7.8  3.1 
Senegal -0.6  -0.1  1.2  3.3 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  -0.7      22.1 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -0.9  2.8  5.7  15.7 
United Arab Emirates  -1.0      0.1 
Chad -1.9  1.4  0.8  3.1 
Kuwait -3.6      0.3 
*All developing countries with negative growth rates (14 countries with a total 
population of 68.6 million).  Exports and imports include goods and services and are 
measured at constant prices. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Bank GDN databases. 
 




capita  Exports Imports 
Population in 
Million (1980) 
China 8.3  10.4  8.0  981.2 
Korea, Rep.  6.6  12.9  10.5  38.1 
Equatorial Guinea  6.4      0.2 
Taiwan, China  6.1      17.6 
Singapore 5.9      2.3 
St. Kitts and Nevis  5.9  2.9  2.9  0.0 
Thailand 5.5  11.9  8.0  46.7 
Indonesia 4.7  2.6  3.7  148.3 
Botswana 4.7      0.9 
Hong Kong, China  4.5  11.0  10.8  5.0 
Antigua and Barbuda  4.4  5.4  4.8  0.1 
Dominica 4.2  9.1  1.8  0.1 
Bhutan 4.1      0.5 
Malta 4.1      0.4 
Chile 3.9  7.7  5.5  11.1 
Malaysia 3.9  11.1  9.6  13.8 
India 3.8  8.5  6.5  687.3 
St. Vincent and the  3.7 4.4  2.6  0.1 
St. Lucia  3.7  4.0  3.1  0.1 
Mauritius 3.7  7.4  6.8  1.0 
Grenada 3.4  6.0  3.8  0.1 
Maldives 3.3      0.2 
Vietnam 3.2      53.7 
Sri Lanka  3.1  6.0  5.6  14.7 
  33 Cape Verde  3.1      0.3 
Pakistan 3.0  5.8  1.4  82.7 
 
* Non-oil-exporting developing countries with per-capita GDP growth rate of 3 percent 
or more (26 countries with combined population of 2106.5 million in 1980). Exports and 
imports include goods and services and are measured at constant prices. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Bank GDN database.  




capita  Exports   Imports 
Population in 
Million (1980) 
Afghanistan -0.1      16.0 
Gambia, The  -0.1  2.7  -1.1  0.6 
Estonia -0.1      1.5 
Guatemala -0.2  1.5  3.4  6.8 
Ecuador -0.2  4.9  -1.7  8.0 
Samoa -0.2      0.2 
Namibia -0.2  2.5  2.6  1.0 
El Salvador  -0.3  3.6  5.7  4.6 
Latvia -0.3      2.5 
Gabon -0.3  2.8  0.1  0.7 
South Africa  -0.4  2.9  2.5  27.6 
Honduras -0.5  0.8  1.6  3.6 
Bolivia -0.5  2.7  4.3  5.4 
Netherlands Antilles  -0.5      0.2 
Croatia -0.5      4.6 
Togo -0.5  -0.8  0.0  2.6 
Yemen, Rep.  -0.6      8.5 
Sao Tome and  -0.6      0.1 
Rwanda -0.7  -1.0  5.5  5.2 
Albania -0.7      2.7 
Algeria -0.7  3.5  -2.1  18.7 
Suriname -0.7  -5.6  -6.4  0.4 
Cameroon -0.7  4.8  4.0  8.7 
Romania -0.8     22.2 
  35 Mali -0.9  6.9  4.0  6.6 
Somalia -0.9      5.9 
Nigeria -0.9  0.0  -3.0  71.1 
Vanuatu -0.9      0.1 
Comoros -1.0  11.3  0.1  0.3 
Lithuania -1.0      3.4 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  -1.0      0.1 
Belarus -1.0      9.6 
Russian Federation  -1.1      139.0 
Bahrain -1.1      0.3 
Burundi -1.2  7.7  2.6  4.1 
Venezuela, RB  -1.2  3.3  2.1  15.1 
Uzbekistan -1.2     16.0 
Central African  -1.3      2.3 
Angola -1.4      7.0 
Kuwait -1.5      1.4 
Zambia -1.6  -0.1  -2.3  5.7 
Djibouti -1.6      0.3 
Madagascar -1.9  0.8 -1.9  8.9 
Nicaragua -1.9  2.7  3.2  2.9 
Kyrgyz Republic  -1.9      3.6 
Cote d'Ivoire  -1.9  2.9  0.1  8.2 
Liberia -2.0      1.9 
Marshall Islands  -2.1      0.0 
Armenia -2.2     3.1 
Haiti -2.2  2.7  5.6  5.4 
United Arab Emirates  -2.4      1.0 
Kiribati -2.4      0.1 
Kazakhstan -2.5     14.9 
  36 Saudi Arabia  -2.6      9.4 
Niger -2.6  0.1  -5.1  5.6 
Brunei -2.8      0.2 
Sierra Leone  -2.9  -4.8  -5.2  3.2 
Moldova -3.6     4.0 
Tajikistan -4.1      4.0 
Ukraine -4.3      50.0 
Libya -4.5      3.0 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -4.5      27.0 
Georgia -4.7      5.1 
Azerbaijan -5.1     6.2 
Iraq -9.5      13.0 
*Developing and Transition economies with negative growth rates (65 countries with 
combined population of 621.4 million).  Exports and imports include goods and services 
and are measured at constant prices. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Bank GDN database. 
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